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ABSTRACT
Most justice researchers have defined outcomes and procedural
characteristics, two key determinants of procedural justice perceptions,
in a limited way. In addition, cultural values have been mostly ignored
in previous procedural justice research. In this article we present new
conceptualizations of outcomes and procedures and delineate how
individualism-collectivism interacts with outcomes and procedural
characteristics to determine procedural justice perceptions. In so doing,
we contend that because of different information-processing styles and
contrasting preference of behavioral styles between individualists and
collectivists, procedural justice perceptions are shaped differently. A
cross-cultural perspective on procedural justice presented here calls for
more future research on different psychological dynamics of procedural
justice perceptions across cultural values.
Employees in organizations are greatly concerned about
fairness of a variety of organizational practices, and their
fairness perceptions have strong effects on their attitudes and
behaviors. Three lines of organizational justice research focus on
how justice perceptions are shaped and, in turn, how those
perceptions affect employee reactions. One camp of scholars has
dealt with the distributive issues (i.e., distributive justice). Most
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distributive justice theories focus on two issues: 1) social
comparison processes leading to outcome fairness perceptions
(Adams, 1965; Suls & Wills, 1991); and 2) distributive rules (e.g.,
equity, equality, and need) (Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Leventhal,
1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980). A second line of scholars
has concentrated on the procedural issues in organizational
decision-making (i.e., procedural justice). Since the pioneering
research of Thibaut and Walker (1975, 1978), many researchers
have noted that under certain circumstances, people are
concerned more about procedures than immediate outcomes. An
individual’s reactions in social relationships, therefore, depend on
fairness of procedures used by third parties or disputants. Lastly,
some researchers have focused on quality of interpersonal
treatment in the enactment of organizational procedures, which
emphasizes the interpersonal relationships issues (i.e.,
interactional justice: Bies & Moag, 1986). They note that
interpersonal treatment, as an informal aspect of organizational
procedures, affects employee fairness perceptions. 
The apparent independence of those three branches of
organizational justice notwithstanding, recent justice research
begins to show that they are more similar than previously
thought. Greenberg (1987) once noted that perceptions of
distributive justice and procedural justice may perceptually
overlap each other. A recent monistic perspective on justice also
suggests that “both procedural justice perceptions and
distributive justice perceptions are, in some sense, derived from
individuals’ expectations about outcomes” (Cropanzano &
Ambrose, 2001: 120). Van den Bos and his colleagues (1997)
provide evidence that procedural and distributive justice
perceptions are not fundamentally distinct. 
The overlap between procedural and distributive justice
becomes more striking when we look at determinants of
procedural justice perceptions. Needless to say, a particular set
of procedural characteristics directly influences procedural
justice perceptions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, Rasinski, &
Spodick, 1985). In addition, as suggested by an instrumental (or
self-interested) model of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Thibaut & Walker, 1975), favorable outcomes contribute to
procedural justice perceptions as well. As such, recent
researchers agree on the effects of both outcome favorability and
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procedural characteristics on procedural justice perceptions
(e.g., Van den Bos et al., 1997). 
In this paper, we propose the refined conceptualizations of
outcomes and procedures. More specifically, two types of
outcomes are distinguished to better understand the effect of
outcome favorability: individual outcomes and group outcomes.
Following previous research, this paper contrasts participative
procedures with autocratic procedure (i.e., no participation) to
investigate the effect of procedural characteristics. Furthermore,
the paper elaborates participative procedures into two types:
individual participation and representative participation. In
summary, we redefine procedures as individual participation,
representative participation, and autocratic procedure. 
With the refined definition of outcomes and procedures in
mind, we will investigate relationships of outcome favorability
and procedures to procedural justice perceptions. Of greater
importance, we propose that the effects of the different types of
outcomes and procedures on procedural justice perceptions
depend on cultural value differences. The model of this article is
shown in Figure 1. As implied in the Figure 1, the purpose of
this article is to call for more cross-cultural research on
procedural justice by providing a model pertaining to formation
of procedural justice perceptions of employees. Given that one of
the future directions of procedural justice research is to













Figure 1. Formation of Procedural Justice Perceptions
incorporate cultural values in the research (Greenberg, 1996;
Konovsky, 2000), this article seeks to illustrate how procedural
justice research can proceed to the stage of cross-cultural
research.
SOURCES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS (I):
OUTCOME FAVORABILITY
When individuals evaluate a decision in social relationships,
their calculative motive drives them to focus on the extent to
which the decision is beneficial to them. They judge the decision
on the basis of outcome favorability, evaluated by benefits and
costs of the decision. The larger the difference between benefits
and costs of the decision is, the more likely individuals will
evaluate the decision favorably and show positive reactions,
including procedural justice perceptions. This effect is known as
outcome favorability (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Outcome Favorability and Procedural Justice
When we consider outcome favorability within a procedural
justice framework, an interesting question is whether procedural
justice perceptions are independent of knowledge about
outcomes of a decision (Rawls, 1971). In other words, when
individuals evaluate fairness of a procedure, is their procedural
fairness perception affected by outcomes? Although Rawls (1971)
argues that people should evaluate fairness in terms of the
normative perspective of “behind the veil of ignorance,” they do
not seem to make procedural fairness judgments independently
of their outcomes. In addition, despite Greenberg’s (1987)
finding that monetary rewards did not justify the procedures
used for reward allocation, numerous studies show that
favorable outcomes enhance procedural justice perceptions. 
Researchers discuss the effect of outcome favorability on
procedural justice perceptions in light of egocentric bias in
fairness (Messick & Sentis, 1983). Namely, the concerns about
procedural justice have been described as an effort to pursue
favorable outcomes, meaning that procedural justice perceptions
will be in part determined by the extent to which a procedure
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offers favorable outcomes. Both Thibaut and Walker’s (1975)
theory of the distribution of control and Leventhal’s (1980) six
principles of procedural justice note that procedural justice
perceptions greatly depend on outcome favorability.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) distinguished two types of control:
1) decision control, which refers to the ability to determine the
final outcomes; and 2) process control, which refers to the ability
to develop the dispute issues and present arguments to resolve
legal disputes. People generally want to resolve the disputes on
their own (i.e., decision control), because they believe that
decision control will give them favorable outcomes in the end
(Brett, 1986). In the absence of decision control, the procedure
to guarantee process control would be perceived to be more fair
and more satisfactory, which is labeled as the process-control
effect. This effect has been explained in terms of outcome
implications of process control (Lind & Tyler, 1988). It is
favorable outcomes brought by process control that enhance
procedural justice perceptions. In summary, the reason why
decision and process controls enhance procedural justice
perceptions is that both controls contribute to favorable
outcomes.
Leventhal (1980) postulated six procedural justice rules (i.e.,
consistency, bias-suppression, accuracy, correctability,
representativeness, and ethicality) that are much broader than
Thibaut and Walker’s theory and yet more relevant to
organizational settings. He contended that because those six
rules help individuals obtain favorable outcomes the rules
enhance procedural justice perceptions, which is consistent with
the argument of outcome favorability. 
The above discussion indicates that outcomes play a role as
information in assessing procedural justice. Lind and Lissak
(1985) found that legal disputants use final outcomes in dispute
resolutions as information in order to understand their
experiences in legal processes. Daly and Tripp (1996) also found
that when procedural information is inaccessible employees rely
on outcome information to make procedural fairness judgments.
Van den Bos and his colleagues (1997) demonstrated that
procedural justice perceptions are determined by outcome
information when outcome information is provided earlier than
procedural information.
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Several empirical studies illustrated that positive outcomes
have a strong effect on ratings of procedural justice (Conlon,
1993; Conlon & Fasolo, 1990). Lind and his colleagues (1993)
reported a significant path coefficient from outcome favorability
to procedural justice perceptions of court-ordered arbitration. In
sum, of great importance in assessing procedural fairness is
whether a procedure satisfies an individual’s need for favorable
outcomes. Thus, 
Proposition 1: The more favorable the outcomes, the higher the
procedural justice perceptions.
Types of Outcomes 
Lind and his colleagues suggested that “it may be time for
procedural justice researchers and theorists to reexamine the
role of outcome evaluations in determining whether procedures
are seen as fair or unfair” (1993: 246). Following their
suggestion, we reexamine the role of outcome evaluations by
distinguishing two types of outcomes. We propose that outcomes
of decisions can be grouped into two categories in terms of
reference points in assessment of outcomes: individual outcomes
and group outcomes. 
Employees in organizations care much about individual
outcomes, i.e., how much they benefit personally from a variety
of decisions. Pursuit of individual outcomes, for instance, is
manifested in almost all distributive negotiation and bargaining
procedures. Individuals are also concerned about group
outcomes, i.e., how much the group to which they belong
benefits from decisions. One of the main concerns of union
representatives in labor-management negotiation, for instance,
is to protect collective outcomes of the union members. 
Given the scant attention to group outcomes in prior research,
it is worth discussing how group outcomes should be studied.
Group outcomes can be defined in two possible ways: 1)
outcome received by a group as a unity (e.g., group bonus); and
2) the sum of outcomes received by all members of a group. We
suggest that the former would be more appropriate to our
purpose, since the latter would cause the possible confounding
effects of individual outcomes and group outcomes. If we take
the second definition, it could be very difficult, if not impossible,
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to disentangle the effect of one outcome from that of the other,
as those two outcomes by nature are highly likely to be related. 
The distinction between individual and group outcomes is not
only a theoretical concern. It has some practical implications as
well. First, many companies have recently started to implement
team-centered management. This new trend brings about a lot of
changes on an employee side. As tasks are assigned to and
performance is evaluated at the team level, the team is more
likely to be a central unit impacting employee cognitions and
behaviors. Accordingly, employees become more sensitive to the
issue of how favorable a variety of decisions is to their group.
Second, group-incentive plans (Dulebohn & Martocchio, 1998)
are increasingly widely used not only by Asian companies but
also by Western companies. With the increasing acceptance of
the new incentive scheme at the group level, favorability of group
outcomes becomes a critical concern to employees.
Previous research on outcome favorability does not take into
account the two types of outcomes; rather, justice scholars have
focused exclusively on individual outcomes. Building upon the
existing body of literature demonstrating the information role of
individual outcomes, we note the informational function of group
outcome favorability. When people assess procedural fairness,
they attend to group- as well as individual outcome favorability.
The differential effects of individual/group outcome favorability
on procedural justice perceptions are determined by cultural
values.
I-C, Outcome Favorability, and Procedural Justice
While very little has been known as to whether and how
cultural values af fect formation of procedural justice
perceptions, early writings allude to the possibility that cultural
values would have an influence on procedural justice
perceptions. As a case in point, the ethicality rule of Leventhal
(1980) provides us with a nice linkage between procedural
justice and cultural values. The ethicality rule states that in
order to be seen as fair, decision-making procedures should be
compatible with moral values of individuals. To the extent that
moral values reflect cultural values, procedural justice
perceptions should also be af fected by cultural values.
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Therefore, the more a procedure is congruent with cultural
values, the more likely the procedure will be viewed as fair.
Extending the logic of the ethicality rule, we argue that if a
procedure provides an individual with outcomes compatible with
the individual’s cultural values, then the procedure will be seen
as fair. The cultural value that is most pertinent to our purpose
is individualism-collectivism. 
Individualism-collectivism. Individualism-collectivism (I-C)
has been considered to be a cultural syndrome that is a pattern
characterized by shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles, and
values that are organized around a theme (Triandis, 1995: 43).
Collectivism refers to the tendency to be concerned more about
interests of the group or group members with “unquestioned
attachment” (Triandis, 1990: 55) to the group. Collectivists are
expected to subordinate personal interests to the collective good.
In addition, because they define themselves as part of their
group (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), they put an ultimate value
on interpersonal relationships and group harmony (Triandis,
1995). In short, they regard good relationships with group
members and self-sacrifice for the sake of the group as moral
imperatives (Triandis, 1990). Individualism indicates the
inclination to be concerned more about interests of an individual
(self). Individualists are expected to seek individual outcomes
with little consideration of group interests. For instance, they
frequently ask “what’s in this for me?” in social encounters
(Triandis, 1990). They also define themselves as independent
beings and value independence from their groups more than
relationships with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In sum,
pursuit of individual outcomes and independence is primary
motivation of individualists.
I-C and procedural justice. Cross-cultural research on
procedural justice has recently begun (Brockner et al., 2000;
Lind & Earley, 1992; Lind, Tyler, & Huo, 1997). A first question
addressed by cross-cultural procedural justice researchers is
whether non-Westerners (i.e., collectivists) care about procedural
justice issues as well (e.g., LaTour, Houlden, Walker, & Thibaut,
1976). Tyler and his colleagues (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler,
Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) proposed that procedural
justice concerns are ubiquitous across diverse societal and
cultural settings. Similarly, Sugawara and Huo (1994) found
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that the Japanese show a strong concern about procedural
justice in conflict resolutions. White, Tansky, and Baik (1995)
reported that Korean subjects reveal concerns about procedural
justice, although their concerns are lower than those of
American subjects. 
A second interest of cross-cultural procedural justice
researchers is in the different preference for conflict resolution
procedures between individualists and collectivists. Leung and
Lind (1986) found that Chinese subjects do not prefer adversary
procedure to inquisitorial procedure, whereas American subjects
prefer adversary procedure because they are allowed to exercise
process control with that procedure. According to Leung (1987),
the Chinese prefer mediation and bargaining to a greater extent
than do American subjects, because the Chinese believe that
mediation and bargaining procedures hinder group harmony
less than does adversary procedure. 
The gradually increasing interest in cross-cultural procedural
justice research notwithstanding, the following question still
remains unanswered: Do the effects of determinants of
procedural justice perceptions vary across different cultural
values? 
I-C, individual and group outcome favorability, and procedural
justice. As noted previously, outcome favorability as a
determinant of procedural justice perceptions can be assessed
with regard to two reference points, i.e., individual outcomes
and group outcomes. Previous research on the dif ferent
information-processing styles of individualists and collectivists
(Earley, 1989, 1994; Earley, Gibson, & Chen, 1999; Markus &
Kitayama, 1991) gives us some clues as to how I-C determines
which reference point of outcome favorability would be more
important for procedural justice perceptions. Individualists in
general show a self-oriented information processing style,
suggesting that self-related information is more easily attended,
saved, and retrieved. Consequently, their cognitions, emotions,
and behaviors are significantly af fected by self-related
information. Collectivists, in contrast, display a group-oriented
information processing style. Their cognitions and behaviors,
therefore, are greatly influenced by group-related information. 
A series of studies of Earley and his colleagues demonstrates
the effect of differential salience of self or group resulting from
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the different information-processing styles of individualists and
collectivists on their behaviors and cognitions. For instance,
while social loafing occurs for individualists because of their
pursuit for self-interest, collectivists work harder, due to their
concerns about group performance, when they are in group
settings than when they are alone (Earley, 1989). Individualists
who are provided with individual-focused training emphasizing
personal capability are found to show higher self-efficacy and
task performance; collectivists with group-focused training that
emphasizes in-group capability have higher self-efficacy and
task performance (Earley, 1994). In performance feedback,
individualists base their self-efficacy and self-evaluations of
performance on individual-referenced feedback; collectivists rely
on feedback concerning their group performance as well as
individual-referenced feedback (Earley et al., 1999). 
Given that outcomes play an informational function in
assessing procedural fairness, the different information-
processing styles of I-C lead them to focus on different reference
points in assessing outcome favorability. Throughout a long
socialization individualists learn that pursuit of self-interest is
their primary goal in social relationships (Hofstede, 1980, 1991).
Consequently, they judge an outcome as favorable if the
outcome satisfies their self-interest, even when it is detrimental
(or neutral) to the collective they belong to. Therefore, if a
procedure gives favorable individual outcomes to individualists,
then they will see the procedure as fair. Group interest may
serve as an alternative reference point in assessing outcome
favorability, especially for collectivists. They are socialized in a
way that they value collective interest and that it is often
required to subordinate self-interest to the collective good
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991). Accordingly, collectivists judge an
outcome as favorable if the outcome contributes to group-
interest, even when it is detrimental (or neutral) to self.
Therefore, if a procedure provides favorable group outcomes to
collectivists, then they will view the procedure as fair.
Individualists and collectivists follow different rationalities:
individual rationality and collective rationality. According to
Chen and his colleagues, “Individual rationality dictates doing
what is in one’s own best interests. ... The willingness to work
for the interests and preferences of others is determined by the
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extent to which such actions are in some way instrumental in
obtaining personal goals. Collective rationality, in contrast,
regards the pursuit of group goals and values. ... Individual
actions are evaluated in terms of their instrumentality to the
fulfillment of the needs and preferences of the collectivity” (1998:
290). Such dif ferent rationalities ask individualists and
collectivists to attend to different reference points in assessing
outcome favorability. Because pursuit of self-interest is rational
to individualists, they will focus on individual outcomes; given
that realization of group-interest is rational to collectivists,
group outcomes will be more important to them.
The foregoing discussion proposes that outcome favorability to
self is more important to individualists, because it reflects self-
referenced evaluations and information; outcome favorability to
group is more important to collectivists, since it includes group-
referenced evaluations and information. Combining the
arguments of outcome favorability and different information-
processing styles of individualists and collectivists, we suggest
the following propositions.  
Proposition 2: For individualists the effect of individual
outcome favorability on procedural justice perceptions will be
greater than that of group outcome favorability, whereas for
collectivists the ef fect of group outcome favorability on
procedural justice perceptions will be greater than that of
individual outcome favorability.
Proposition 3: The effect of individual outcome favorability on
procedural justice perceptions will be greater for individualists
than for collectivists, whereas the effect of group outcome
favorability on procedural justice perceptions will be greater for
collectivists than for individualists.
SOURCES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE PERCEPTIONS (II):
PROCEDURAL CHARACTERISTICS
Another important determinant of procedural justice
perceptions is the characteristics of a procedure in decision-
making. Tyler, Rasinsky, and Spodick (1985) suggested that
procedural justice perceptions are shaped by a procedure per se.
If a procedure has some characteristics, individuals see the
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procedure as fair regardless of its outcome implications.
Previous studies have attempted to identify those procedural
characteristics: whether a decision is made on the basis of
objective and correct information; whether an opportunity to
appeal against decisions is provided; whether a procedure is
consistently applied over time and over people, and so on.
Among these, an opportunity of participating in decision-making
is one of the most widely studied procedural characteristics.
Participation is a process in which influence is shared among
individuals who are otherwise hierarchical unequals (Wagner,
1994: 312). It is also known as process control (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975), or voice (Folger, 1977). Most researchers agree
that participation is always better than no-participation in terms
of procedural justice perceptions, which is termed as the voice
effect (Greenberg & Folger, 1983). 
Lind, Lissak, and Conlon (1983) found that disputants’
process control led high procedural fairness perceptions, even
when process control has low implications for outcomes. Earley
(1984) showed that subjects in the post-decision voice condition
gave higher ratings of procedural fairness than did subjects in
the no-voice condition. If subjects regarded the voice as a mere
means of getting favorable outcomes, there would be no reason
to show different justice perceptions between the post-decision
voice condition and the no-voice condition. Therefore, his study
strongly indicates that individuals do not regard participation
only as an instrument to acquire favorable outcomes. A
laboratory experiment by Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, and Lind
(1987) also showed substantially higher procedural justice
perceptions in the voice condition than in the no-voice condition,
regardless of outcomes of performance evaluation. A series of
studies of Tyler (1987, 1989, 1990, 1994) consistently showed
that participation has an independent effect on procedural
justice perceptions. 
Many studies in organizational settings have also shown the
effect of participation on procedural justice perceptions. Bies
and Shapiro (1988) reported that subjects who read the scenario
in which a job applicant has a say in job interview rate the
interview procedure to be more fair than did those who read the
scenario in which a job applicant does not have a voice. Davy,
Kinicki, and Scheck (1991) showed that participation has a
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positive impact on employee perceptions of fairness of the layoff
decision-making process. 
All studies reviewed above illustrate that an opportunity to
express opinions helps individuals see the procedure as fair
regardless of subsequent outcomes allocated to them. The
opportunity satisfies an individual’s self-expressive motive. This
line of research leads Lind and Tyler to conclude that
“procedures are viewed as fairer when they vest process control
or voice in those affected by a decision” (1988: 208). Therefore,
Proposition 4: Procedural justice perceptions will be higher
with participation than with no participation.
Types of Procedures
In this paper, we focus on three types of decision-making
procedures: individual participation, representative participation,
and autocratic procedure. Our distinction differs from that of
previous studies in such a way that it considers two types of
participation: individual participation and representative
participation. Autocratic procedure and individual participation
can be regarded as two opposite extremes on a continuum
defined in terms of the level of participation. We further propose a
third type of participation, representative participation, which
can be placed in the middle of the continuum.
Individual participation indicates a procedure in which all
individuals who are affected by a decision are allowed to express
their own personal opinions. This procedure consequently allows
highly individualized behaviors of all parties in decision-making.
The expressed opinions reflect mainly each individual’s self-
interest. Individual participation is similar to the CI type of
leadership of Vroom and Yetton defined as “decision makers
share the problem with the relevant subordinates individually,
getting their ideas and suggestions without bringing them
together as a group” (1973: 13).
Representative participation is a procedure in which
representatives of a group propose opinions on behalf of group
members. Individual members do not participate directly but
only through representatives who represent the shared interests
of group members (Cotton, Vollrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-Hal, &
Jennings, 1988). In that sense, representative participation does
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not need individualized behaviors of all individuals affected by a
decision. Other than that, representative participation differs
from individual participation in many ways. Whereas individual
participation is good for conveying each individual’s personal
interests, representative participation is instrumental in
securing group interests. It should be noted that representative
participation is not a just addition of another layer to decision-
making. In other words, representatives do not simply convey
each individual’s opinions to higher-ups. Before participating in
decision-making representatives think through from all angles
whether the opinions of each member contribute to their group.
The major concern of representatives, therefore, is to secure
group interests instead of realizing one individual member’s
interests. Representative participation is similar to the CII type
of leadership of Vroom and Yetton defined as “decision makers
share the problem with their subordinates as a group, obtaining
their collective ideas and suggestions” (1973: 13).
Lastly, autocratic procedure refers to a procedure in which
decisions are made by a few decision-makers who have authority
to make decisions without other members’ participation.
Autocratic procedure corresponds to the AII type of leadership of
Vroom and Yetton (1973). They described the AII type as
“decision makers obtain the necessary information from their
subordinates, then decide the solution to the problem
themselves” (1973: 13).
The distinction between individual participation and
representative participation is not merely a theoretical concern,
but it also has some practical implications. Indeed, many
companies today employ representative participation in decision-
makings, like workplace democracy programs. Work councils, for
instance, are groups of nominated or elected employees who
must be consulted when management makes decisions. Board
representatives are employees who serve on a company’s board
of directors and represent the interests of employees. Because
previous procedural justice research did not consider
representative participation, very little is known about how
employees perceive it. Do they view representative participation
as more fair than autocratic procedure? Of representative
participation and individual participation, which one is seen as
more fair? With those questions unanswered, many companies
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are widely using representative participation. Given that those
two different participation modes require different behavioral
styles, we suggest that I-C will affect the effect of two types of
participation on procedural justice perceptions.
I-C, Procedural Characteristics, and Procedural Justice 
Some scholars have recently begun to attempt to identify
potential moderators of the voice effect. For example, Brockner and
his colleagues (1998) showed that the effect of the perceived voice
on reactions is more pronounced among people with high self-
esteem. Their findings suggest that the voice effect is qualified by
individual personality traits. In contrast, no research has taken into
account cultural values as a moderator of the voice effect. Several
reviewers on participation research, however, indicate that the
effects of diverse types of participation vary with contextual factors
(Cotton et al., 1988; Locke & Schweiger, 1979). Among those
contextual factors, cultural values will affect relationships between
individual/representative participation on procedural justice
perceptions.
Intuitively, the effect of participation may be influenced by
power distance (Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Kirkman & Shapiro,
1997), the extent to which individuals tolerate an unequal
distribution of power. People in low power distance cultures
believe everybody to be equal in power distribution; therefore,
they perceive participative procedure to be fair and prefer it. This
being the case, power distance could be employed as an
appropriate moderator for the comparison between participation
and no-participation procedures. However, it should be noted
that we also compare two different types of participation:
individual and representative participation. For this purpose, I-C
is a more appropriate than power distance for the reasons
presented below.
Individual participation has been widely studied in procedural
justice research. Previous studies defined and operationalized
participation as individual participation. We contend that this
procedure satisfies individualists’ primary needs and suits for
their preferred behavioral styles. First of all, individualists value
individual initiative and emphasize personal freedom in
organizations (Earley & Gibson, 1998). Because they also want
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to enhance self-image of an independent being, they prefer
highly individualized behaviors that are allowed in individual
participation (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Second, individualists
want to be seen as a distinct individual. An American proverb,
for instance, “the squeaky wheel gets the grease” shows an
individualistic value of distinctiveness (Markus & Kitayama,
1991). They believe that in organizations they should be allowed
to express what is in their mind. Individual participation indeed
permits them to express their distinct voices. Lastly,
individualists want to exercise individual control over decision-
makings, since they value individuality of each individual. An
opportunity to make individual voices reinforces their
impression of individual control. In summary, because
individual participation has a potential to meet individualists’
needs and behavioral preferences, individualists see individual
participation to be more fair than the other two procedures.
Representative participation is being widely used in practice,
yet it has not been integrated into procedural justice research.
We argue that this procedure is more appealing to collectivists
for several reasons than individual participation. First,
collectivists value interpersonal harmony with in-group
members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They do not want to
express individual opinions that may conflict with group goals
(Triandis, 1995). They also feel pressures from in-group
members to subordinate their personal opinions to the group
good. In that sense, individual participation would not be so
attractive to them, since individual participation sometimes
breaks group harmony by bringing diverse voices up. Instead,
collectivists prefer a procedure that builds and maintains group
harmony. Group representatives (e.g., team leaders) can
enhance group harmony by screening out the differences in
opinions among group members, reconciling the differences
among group members, and participating in decision-making on
behalf of their group. 
Second, most collectivists do not feel comfortable with highly
individualized behaviors in individual participation. An Asian
proverb “the nail that stands out gets pounded down” shows
collectivists’ reluctance to distinctiveness (Markus & Kitayama,
1991). They expect their leader to read their opinions and
represent them in decision-making. This tendency reflects
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collectivists’ dependence on others (Triandis, 1995). In short,
representative participation matches collectivists’ behavioral
preferences and contributes to group harmony, and thus it will
be judged to be more fair by collectivists than individual
participation. 
Individualists’ preference for individual participation and
collectivists’ preference for representative participation can be
also explained in terms of their differential sensitivity to
individual- and group outcomes. Because individual
participation is good for expressing and protecting self-interest,
individualists who primarily pursue self-interest will see
individual participation as more fair. Representative
participation is good for expressing and protecting group-
interest that is a primary concern of collectivists, provided
representatives are supposed to express voice on behalf of
groups. Therefore, collectivists will view representative
participation as more fair. 
Lastly, following the line of previous research, we propose that
autocratic procedure will be seen as unfair by both individualists
and collectivists. The high correlation between collectivism and
power distance (Hofstede, 1980) might lead us to conclude that
collectivists prefer autocratic procedure to either type of
participative procedures. However, many studies showed that
participation is appealing to collectivists as well. Erez (1986)
found that participative management is more effective in the
highly collectivistic Kibbutz than in the public or private
organizations where collectivism is less emphasized. Erez and
Somech (1996) also proposed the same arguments. Moreover,
organizations in highly collectivistic cultures widely use
participative decision-making. Worker participation through
coordinated work teams in Japan or worker collectives in the
People’s Republic of China are examples of representative
participation systems widely accepted by collectivists (Earley &
Gibson, 1998). The above discussion suggests two following
propositions. 
Proposition 5: For individualists procedural justice perceptions
will be higher with individual participation than with the other
two types of procedures, whereas for collectivists procedural
justice perceptions will be higher with representative
participation than with the other two types of procedures.
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Proposition 6: With individual participation procedure
individualists will perceive higher procedural justice than
collectivists, whereas with representative participation
procedure, collectivists will perceive higher procedural justice
than individualists.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
We derived a number of propositions as to how procedural
justice perceptions are formed. Although outcome favorability
has been found to be one of the crucial determinants of
procedural justice perceptions, previous studies have focused on
only how favorable a decision is to individual employees.
Increasing popularity of group-based outcome distribution (e.g.,
group incentive), however, calls for more research on how group
outcome favorability affects procedural justice perceptions. To
the extent that individuals use outcomes of decisions as relevant
information in assessing procedural fairness (Lind & Lissak,
1985), an individual’s information-processing style will play a
significant role in selecting a relevant reference point in
assessing outcome favorability, which, in turn, af fects
procedural justice perceptions. We attended to dif ferent
information-processing styles of individualists and collectivists
to delineate the effect of individual/group outcome favorability.
In addition, as many organizations become bigger, direct
participation by all employees appears to be impractical.
Consequently, organizations allow only representatives to
participate in decision-making. However, nothing has been
known as to how representative participation, compared to other
procedures, is perceived by employees. We propose that because
of contrasting preference for behavioral styles of individualists
and collectivists, they perceive representative participation and
individual participation differently in terms of procedural justice. 
We provide a number of suggestions to researchers who want
to test the arguments presented in this paper. First, researchers
do not necessarily have to operationalize outcomes in light of
material (or economic) outcomes as done generally before.
Individuals indeed receive not only material outcomes but also
psychological (or socioemotional) outcomes (Cropanzano &
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Ambrose, 2001). Therefore, just as individuals are concerned
about material outcome favorability, they also tend to judge and
react to a decision on the basis of psychological outcome
favorability. An example of self-related psychological needs is
pride in self, and an example of group-related psychological
needs is harmony among group members. The logic of this
article suggests that individualists will see a procedure as fair if
the procedure enhances their pride in self; collectivists will view
a procedure as fair if the procedure contributes to harmony
among group members. As such, future research should address
the effect of psychological outcomes on procedural justice
perceptions as well. When we investigate the effects of both
types of outcomes, we can fully understand the effect of outcome
favorability on procedural justice perceptions.
Second, this article emphasizes the moderating role of a
cultural value, individualism-collectivism, in formation of
procedural justice perceptions. Researchers need to measure I-C
at the individual level. Earlier cross-cultural studies used the
country as a proxy for cultural values. However, recent scholars
began to argue that cultural values of individuals should be
directly measured at the individual level rather than using the
country as a proxy if researchers are to investigate the effect of
cultural values (Chen, Brockner, & Katz, 1998). It is because
there are I-C differences across members within a culture in
addition to I-C differences across members of different cultures
(Triandis, 1989). We also advise researchers to control for the
country variable in data analyses in order to rule out the
possible country effect (Chen et al., 1998) and capture the pure
effect of cultural values.
Third, considering only I-C would not be enough to investigate
the effect of I-C. Other cultural values that might be highly
correlated to I-C and suppress the effect of I-C should be
considered together and controlled for. For example, it is widely
known that power distance is significantly related to I-C
(Hofestede, 1980, 1991). Individuals showing high power
distance might perceive autocratic procedure as more fair than
either type of participation procedures. This article argued that
collectivists will perceive representative participation as more
fair than autocratic procedure. Therefore, if researchers who are
interested in testing the argument do not control for power
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distance, the effect of I-C could be distorted by power distance. 
Lastly, recent studies on procedural justice appear to lean
towards the investigation of the ef fect of procedural
characteristics. In contrast, outcome allocation has been
considered mostly in distributive justice research. Given that
both outcome favorability and procedural characteristics affect
procedural fairness perceptions, as this article argued,
researchers who focus only on one determinant are likely to
make a serious misspecification error. If justice researchers stick
to the assumption that outcomes affect distributive justice and
that processes influence procedural justice, they may run the
risk of losing an opportunity to get better understanding of
formation of fairness perceptions. An approach to procedural
fairness that considers both determinants of procedural fairness
simultaneously would be more desirable.
In addition to the theoretical implications discussed above,
this paper has some messages to practitioners. First, managers
should note the importance of group outcome favorability in
procedural justice perceptions. A series of Greenberg’s studies
(1993, 1994) advised managers to provide justifiable
explanations when they had to distribute negative outcomes to
employees. The ef fect of group outcome favorability on
procedural justice perceptions suggests that managers may as
well provide reasonable explanations to employees when they
distribute unfavorable outcomes to groups. Especially, managers
who deal with collectivistic employees should not be negligent in
providing explanations for negative group outcomes. To the
extent that employees find explanations reasonable and
convincing, hence justifiable, negative reactions to unfavorable
group outcomes will be mitigated. Managers also need to frame
outcome favorability information in a proper way (Chen, Choi, &
Chi, 2002). When they have to give unfavorable individual
outcomes to an employee, they can persuade the employee to
focus on group outcome if the employee’s group receives
favorable outcomes.
Second, the propositions presented in the article suggest that
managers need to realize the importance of employee
participation in decision making. Further, we argue that to fully
take advantage of the benefit of employee participation,
managers should use appropriate participation procedures
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according to situations of their organizations. Although Cotton
once suggested that “it appears that the greatest value of
representative participation is symbolic. If one is interested in
changing employee attitudes or in improving organizational
performance, representative participation would be a poor
choice” (1993: 140), we disagree with his statement; rather,
representative participation can be a good option. Multinational
companies located in the areas where collectivism is dominant,
for instance, need to implement representative participation
because it can enhance procedural justice perceptions. 
While previous justice studies have given scant attention to
the effect of value orientation on procedural justice perceptions,
this paper emphasizes the role of cultural values in formation of
procedural justice perceptions. We propose that different
psychological dynamics of procedural justice perceptions may
operate for individualists and collectivists (cf., Lind, Tyler, &
Huo, 1997). The different psychological dynamics could be
explained by both different information-processing styles and
behavioral preferences of individualists and collectivists. It is
also possible that other cultural values than I-C af fect
procedural justice perceived by employees in organizations,
which is an example of unresolved issues. We call for more
cross-cultural procedural justice research to get better
understanding of procedural justice. 
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